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Abstract: In this paper entrepreneurs are defined as agents who bring about economic change 
by combining their own effort with other factors of production in search of economic rents. 
The institutional setup is argued to determine both the supply and direction of entrepreneurial 
activity. Four key institutions are explored more closely: property rights protection, savings 
policies, taxation and the regulation of labor markets. Institutions have far-reaching effects on 
entrepreneurship, and they largely determine whether or not entrepreneurial activity will be 
socially productive. Due to the responsiveness of entrepreneurship to the institutional setup it 
is maintained that in-depth analyses of specific institutions are required in order to further our 
understanding of the determinants of entrepreneurial behavior and the economic effects of 
entrepreneurship. The paper also demonstrates that it is problematic to use self-employment 
as an empirical proxy for productive entrepreneurship. 
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1. Introduction   
 
In the 1990s entrepreneurship moved to the fore of the economic policy agenda. Many 
governments, in particular in Europe, came to see the entrepreneur as the solution to 
weak economic performance and to deficient job creation.  
 
The research community responded to the demand from policymakers with a virtual 
explosion of entrepreneurship research. Both the number of contributions and the 
diversity of approaches across the various social sciences have been extraordinary, as 
even a cursory look through the recent handbooks will demonstrate (e.g., Acs and 
Audretsch 2003; Shane 2002; and the numerous volumes appearing in Edward Elgar’s 
International Library of Entrepreneurship Series). Entrepreneurship is studied in 
virtually all disciplines, ranging from social anthropology to organizational theory to 
mathematical economics. The areas of focus are equally diverse, including personality, 
opportunity, motivation, environment, organization, coordination, policy, finance and 
more. 
 
The fact that both policymakers and social scientists have become so interested in 
entrepreneurship in recent years should of course be applauded. The problem is that 
“entrepreneurship” and “entrepreneurs” have become overused buzzwords, in particular 
in the policy debate, but sometimes even in academia. The overuse of the term and the 
unrealistic expectations have lead to the real risk of a backlash, especially if the 
entrepreneurs fail to deliver all the great things that were promised by politicians and 
prophesied by scholars. 
 
The development of entrepreneurship research within economics differs somewhat from 
other social sciences. For a long time there were rarely, if ever, any entrepreneurs in the 
models used by neoclassical economists.
1 There are, however, signs that this is changing. 
Leading mainstream economists are beginning to make strong claims, such as “the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Johansson (2004) who shows that the terms “entrepreneurship” or “entrepreneur” are virtually 
nonexistent in the leading textbooks in microeconomics and industrial organization used at the graduate 
level.    2
entrepreneur is the single most important player in a modern economy” (Lazear 2005, p. 
649).  
 
The reason for the disregard of entrepreneurship is not a denial of its significance 
amongst economic researchers. Since the days of Adam Smith, Joseph Schumpeter and 
Friedrich Hayek, most economists have acknowledged the crucial importance of 
entrepreneurs for growth and for the organization of economic activity. The problem is 
instead methodological, and particular to the formal tools of economics. The entrepreneur 
and the entrepreneurial function elude analytical tractability. In recent years, several 
attempts have been made to include these concepts in mainstream economic modeling. 
Bur it seems from these attempts that entrepreneurship is invariably narrowly defined. 
While models can analyze some particular aspect of the problem (e.g. risk aversion), no 
single model has been able to capture the complexity and wide-ranging functions of 
entrepreneurship developed outside formal economics (Bianchi and Henrekson 2005). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a number of methodological issues that are often 




A premise underlying many studies (usually implicitly) is that more entrepreneurship is 
always better. This is not necessarily true, according to most definitions of 
entrepreneurship. In the next section various definitions of entrepreneurship will be 
discussed. In section 3 the analysis will be taken one step further, introducing the crucial 
role of the institutional setup in determining entrepreneurial behavior. The message from 
this section is that entrepreneurship can only be meaningfully analyzed within a well-
defined institutional context. In section 4 I critically discuss whether and to what extent 
self-employment is a reasonable proxy for productive entrepreneurship. In section 5 it is 
suggested that entrepreneurship can be seen as a continual quest for economic rents, i.e. 
                                                 
2 I was originally invited to comment on the following four papers: Cowling (2007), Fonseca et al. (2007), 
Kanniainen and Poutvaara (2007) and Parker (2007). On some occasions I will refer directly to these papers 
when it can serve to illustrate a specific point. For the most part, however, the paper more generally 
evaluates some key aspects of the entrepreneurship literature.   3
rates of return exceeding the risk-adjusted market return. Section 6 explores several key 
institutions governing the behavior of entrepreneurs. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Defining Entrepreneurship  
 
Whenever any concept is analyzed in the social sciences the discussion benefits from a 
clear definition, and from agreement among scholars about the fashion in which it is 
used. This is unfortunately not the case in the area of entrepreneurship research. Hébert 
and Link (2006) provide a summary of the vast literature, identifying at least 12 separate 
definitions (“identities”) that have been used by various scholars. Without delving too 
deeply into details it is obvious that several of these definitions do not constitute true 
entrepreneurship (manager, contractor) whereas other categories (owner of a firm, 
supplier of capital, industrial leader) may be, but are not necessarily entrepreneurial.  
 
So how do I define entrepreneurship? First, it is about individuals and organizations – be 
they new, old, large or small – that actively contribute to renewal and change in the 
economy. This can be either Schumpeterian (Schumpeter 1934) entrepreneurship which 
disturbs an existing equilibrium, or it can be Kirznerian (Kirzner 1973) entrepreneurship, 
which moves the economy towards equilibrium. It does not really matter whether the 
entrepreneur is the person who provokes change or merely adjusts to it. Entrepreneurial 
action can mean both creation of opportunity and response to existing circumstances, 
where entrepreneurs have the daring to embrace risks in the face of uncertainty. 
 
Second, entrepreneurship is a function, one that is carried out by specific individuals –
who can by their own volition decide whether to supply this function. Given that they 
choose to do so, the activities may be productive, unproductive or even destructive from a 
societal perspective (Baumol 1990; Murphy et al. 1991).  
 
Third, individuals carrying out the entrepreneurial function are self-serving agents, so 
that we can reasonably assume that entrepreneurs venture into the type of 
entrepreneurship that they expect will lead to the highest private return.   4
 
Lastly following Wennekers and Thurik (1999), a person can be said to engage in an 
entrepreneurial venture if she either on her own or in teams, and either inside or outside 
existing organizations: 
–  perceives and creates new economic opportunities (new products, new production 
methods, new organizational schemes and new product market combinations), and 
–  introduces her or his idea in the market, in the face of uncertainty and other 




From this definition of entrepreneurship some noteworthy implications follow. To begin 
with, entrepreneurship is largely an open-ended process (Kirzner 1997), an important 
reason why more focus should be given to incalculable uncertainty than to calculable 
risk. Entrepreneurship almost always entails an ambition to grow. This is normally 
achieved by hiring other factors of production in the market, while the entrepreneur 
remains the main or sole residual claimant to the excess value created through the new 
combination of resources. The legal entity within which these activities are organized is 
of course normally the firm. However, the distinctions made above underline why self-
employment cannot be equated to entrepreneurship, and why it is likely to be a poor 
proxy in empirical work. Conversely, employees without an ownership role can also be 
entrepreneurial (intrapreneurship), although this may be difficult to achieve if it is hard to 
write compensation contracts that provide the right incentives.  
 
3. The Crucial Role of the Institutional Setup 
 
Douglass North (e.g., 1990) criticized the received view that economic growth is caused 
by the accumulation of factors of production. He claimed that these are just proximate 
causes of growth. The ultimate causes for development resided instead in the incentive 
structure that encouraged individual effort and investment in physical and human capital 
and in new technology. This incentive structure was in turn determined by “the rules of 
the game in society” or the institutional setup broadly construed. The role of institutions 
                                                 
3 This is closely related to Casson’s (2003) definition of the entrepreneur as “a specialist in taking 
judgemental decisions.”   5
has in recent years re-emerged as a dominant explanation of long-term economic 
performance. In particular, see Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2005).  
 
Baumol (1990) pioneered the role of institutions for entrepreneurial behavior, viz. how 
“the social structure of payoffs” channeled entrepreneurship to different activities – some 
of which are productive, some unproductive and some destructive/predatory. On the 
surface, the logic is deceptively simple. If institutions are such that it is beneficial for the 
individual to spend entrepreneurial effort on circumventing them, the individual will do 
so rather than benefiting from given institutions to reduce uncertainty and enhance 
contract and product quality. The outcome in this case is expected to be one where 
corruption and predatory activities prevail over socially productive entrepreneurship. 
 
Baumol simplifies matters somewhat in that he assumes that the supply of entrepreneurial 
effort in society is constant, so that the institutional setup only matters for its allocation 
across activities. This is one important aspect of the role of institutions, but the supply of 
entrepreneurial effort is also likely to be influenced by the institutional setup. Baumol’s 
analysis of non-productive and destructive entrepreneurship is not only applicable to less 
developed societies. The wealthy world does a good job of directing entrepreneurship 
towards inherently productive purposes (a large part of the explanation for the wealth), 
but there are nevertheless many instances of unproductive or predatory entrepreneurship 
in rich countries as well. Typical examples include the impressive networks of illegal 
cigarette smuggling and distribution in Sweden or the highly competent and successful 
lobbying firms in Brussels.  
 
The central conclusion of the discussion above is that entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
behavior can only be evaluated given the institutional context. There is no guarantee that 
a potential entrepreneur will actually put his or her time and effort to productive use. If 
the institutional setting encourages behavior that is wasteful or destructive from the point 
of view of society more entrepreneurship means less prosperity. The existence of 
externalities does not automatically make entrepreneurship unproductive. New software 
programs that simplify tax planning may increase tax avoidance, and result in more   6
resources being spent by the government on auditing. But they may also reduce the time 
used by taxpayers on socially wasteful tax avoidance efforts.  
 
In reality, the interaction between various dimensions of the institutional setup and the 
type and level of entrepreneurial activity is highly complex and therefore difficult to 
disentangle. A first step towards a better understanding of this complexity is to analyze 
the different motives for self-employment and whether and to what extent these motives 
are entrepreneurial. 
 
4. Self-Employment vs. Entrepreneurship 
 
In the empirical literature on the determinants of self-employment a distinction is often 
made between pull and push factors (Storey 1994). An individual can either be pulled 
into self-employment in order to pursue a lucrative business opportunity (rather than 
having a regular job, or perhaps not working at all) or s/he can be pushed into it because 
there is no better choice for making a living. Reynolds et al. (2002) explicitly distinguish 
between ”opportunity-based” and “necessity” entrepreneurship in their annual effort 
(Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM) to measure the rate of entrepreneurial activity 
across countries.  
 
It may be useful to distinguish between first-best and second-best solutions, as well as 
whether the self-employed are entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial. Another important 
distinction is whether the self-employed pursue productive or unproductive/predatory 
activities (Murphy et al. 1991).  
 
In Table 1 these distinctions are used to identify different motives to start a business. The 
top row gives society’s first-best alternatives. Here, an entrepreneurial business is started 
because it provides the best vehicle for pursuing a business opportunity. Other, strictly 
speaking non-entrepreneurial, motives are to give the owner the opportunity to pursue a 
certain life style, to earn her/his living independently or to facilitate the organization of 
certain projects best pursued as an independent firm but without being an entrepreneurial   7
venture. A franchise could be owned by the manager in order to overcome or mitigate 
agency problems, without implying any entrepreneurship.  
 
Table 1  Reasons for Self-employment. 
 Entrepreneurial  Non-entrepreneurial 
First best  Pursue a business opportunity 
most suitably pursued in a new 
firm 
 
1. Seeking independence, a 
certain life style etc. 
2. Local service production; 
working in networks in 
temporary projects 
    
Second best  1. Inferior management by 
current employer bars efficient 
intrapreneurship 
2. Mechanism to escape effect of 
discrimination or lack of social 
capital for marginal groups 
3. Necessity entrepreneurship 
1. Safety valve to circumvent 
excessive labor market 
regulations 
2. Means to achieve flexibility 
hindered by other regulations 
3. Mechanism to escape effect of 
discrimination or lack of social 
capital for marginal groups 
4. Necessity entrepreneurship 
    
Unproductive/ 
predatory 
1. Set up a business to exploit 
subsidies and tax breaks rather 
than create value for customers 
2. Fraudulence 
3. Looting, warfare etc. 
1. Transform consumption 
expenditure into tax deductible 
business costs 
2. Fraudulence, where revenue is 
partly unreported etc. 
Note: The table lists the major motives for self-employment. There are also intermediate cases. 
Entrepreneurial self-employment may, for instance, be partly pursued in search of independence. 
 
In the second-best case the entrepreneurial motives arise as a result of various obstacles 
barring the optimal outcome. Entrepreneurship here provides a means to circumvent 
obstacles that could emanate either from inappropriate institutions or from within the 
private sector. For instance, inferior management and business organizations may prevent 
an intrapreneur from introducing and reaping the rewards from his or her ideas. 
Legislation could ban the use of stock option incentives to encourage intrapreneurship or 
it could make it prohibitively expensive. A last example is how various forms of 
discrimination often hinder marginal groups from seeking regular employment, leaving   8
self-employment as the remaining opportunity. Other incentives are also at work, 
becoming self-employed can for instance be a way to escape restrictive employment 
regulation or pay schedules. This kind of entrepreneurship may be called evasive (Coyne 
and Leeson 2004). Evasive entrepreneurship may also consist of efforts to evade the legal 
system or to avoid the predatory activities of other agents. Tax evasion and bribes paid to 
regulators or inspectors used to evade onerous regulations are two examples. Hence, 




In the most unfavorable outcome, the incentives are such that entrepreneurs strive to 
exploit the business opportunities arising from the regulation itself. Entrepreneurial 
incentives to start a business may then be geared towards exploiting tax breaks and 
subsidies rather than creating value. Sidestepping or reducing the impact of taxes and 
other legislation are also the prime motives for non-entrepreneurial businesses under this 
kind of regime. In cases where the government does not manage to uphold a monopoly 
on violence and where the rule of rule law does not prevail, entrepreneurship may also 
take on highly destructive forms such as looting and private warfare. 
 
In a world where institutions were such that there were no opportunities for unproductive 
or predatory entrepreneurship and a world of perfect contracts where productive 
entrepreneurship could always be pursued efficiently within existing firms, the only 
reason to be self-employed would be the personal quest for independence. Even 
independence could perhaps theoretically be arranged through advanced contractual 
arrangements inside the organization. This state of affairs is of course far from reality. In 
fact, the long period during which large firms had predominated while small firms had 
been increasingly marginalized came to an end in the 1970s. Entrepreneurship and small 
firms experienced a global resurgence (Loveman and Sengenberger 1991). Scholars have 
suggested several first-best reasons why this occurred (Acs 1999). Furthermore, in reality 
there exists no economic system where the institutional setup is entirely “appropriate” 
                                                 
4 See also van Stel et al. (2007), who argue that institutions determine the distribution of business activity 
between the formal and informal sector of the economy.   9
(Gerschenkron 1962) in the sense that there are no second-best reasons for self-
employment and no opportunities for unproductive or predatory self-employment.  
 
In sum, from a societal perspective the aggregate level of self-employment, measured as 
the rate of self-employment, is not necessarily a meaningful measure. In order to evaluate 
whether there is too much or too little self-employment one needs to decompose the 
aggregate carefully and make it contingent on the institutional setup. Based on this fact, 
some skepticism is warranted towards results from cross-country studies using the rate of 
self-employment as a measure of entrepreneurial activity.
5  
 
5. Entrepreneurship as the Creation or Discovery of Rents 
 
In section 2 it was pointed out that entrepreneurship entails the discovery or creation of 
new economic opportunities. Several distinct types of entrepreneurship were also 
identified: productive, unproductive, evasive and predatory/destructive. The types of 
entrepreneurship are defined based on the social value of the expended entrepreneurial 
effort. However, when seen from the perspective of the self-serving entrepreneur entry is 
based on which type of entrepreneurship that is expected to have the largest private 
return.
6 A venture that is highly profitable for the individual entrepreneur may give rise to 
large social losses.  
 
One fruitful way to analyze entrepreneurship is to posit that entrepreneurs are searching 
for rates of return exceeding the risk-adjusted market rate of return, i.e. they try to create 
or discover economic rents. In other words, entrepreneurship may be seen as rent 
seeking.
7 The entrepreneurial rent arises when entrepreneurship is combined with the use 
                                                 
5 Two recent examples are Blanchflower (2000) and Carree et al. (2002). van Stel et al. (2005) instead use 
the GEM measure of total entrepreneurial activity to explain cross-country growth differentials. However, 
the same criticism largely applies to this measure as well. 
6 This maximizing behavior does necessarily imply narrow selfishness. The entrepreneur could care about 
the welfare of kin and friends, or even about the welfare of the general public. It suffices that the business 
decisions are decoupled from such considerations. The entrepreneur maximizes profits selfishly, but no 
constraint is put on the use of the profits. They may or may not be spent with altruistic considerations.  
7 It should be noted that the term is not used in the constrained way usually applied in Public Choice to 
“describe behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste   10
of other inputs such as capital and labor. Yet, neither in the conventional financial 
accounts at the firm level nor in the national accounts is there an item entitled 
entrepreneurial income. In the case where the entrepreneur is also the business owner 
successful entrepreneurship will instead show up as high rates of return on equity and/or 
as high labor income earned by entrepreneur. Given asymmetric information and moral 
hazard, the risk-adjusted rate of return demanded by external investors may of course be 
extremely high in some cases, often so high that the entrepreneur cannot become a 
qualified entrepreneur unless s/he can finance the venture out of her/his own wealth. 
Likewise entrepreneurs may face a high cost of labor, including being forced to concede 
stock options, if potential workers perceive that the venture is highly uncertain and 
demands firm-specific human capital investments from them. If an entrepreneurial 
venture turns out to be successful, the risk premium demanded by outside financiers (at 
some point debt financing also becomes available) and potential workers will decline and 
the rate of return required for obtaining a positive entrepreneurial rent also declines. 
 
It is useful to distinguish between two types of entrepreneurial rents, namely Ricardian 
and Marshallian rents.
8 David Ricardo defined rents as return to a factor of production 
exceeding the level necessary to ascertain its supply. Scarce land and unique pieces of art 
are typical examples. Entrepreneurs may create Ricardian rents in several ways, perhaps 
most obviously through the patenting of valuable innovations and copyright. They can 
also protect all or some of their innovations themselves through rent protecting 
techniques, in general acquiring some resource that potential competitors cannot easily 
obtain. One example is the implementation of tacit knowledge in organizations that is 
hard to imitate. Still, most rents do not last forever, in particular if they rest on a fixed 
supply of a factor that is man-made. First, patents and copyrights are only granted for a 
fixed time period. Second, in the long term competing firms will normally come up with 
substitutes to the product yielding a Ricardian rent, sometimes by producing a completely 
different product that fills the same basic need or by developing a new mode of 
production. These effects tend to erode the rent in the longer term, since the scarce 
                                                                                                                                                 
rather than social surplus” (Buchanan, 1980, p. 4). In that tradition, rent-seeking is an activity which, by 
definition, generates social loss. That can be seen as a specific subset in our general framework.  
8 See also Lewin and Phelan (2002) and Alvarez (2005) for a discussion of entrepreneurial rents.   11
resource is only fixed or highly constrained for some time. Such temporary rents are 
usually called Marshallian or quasi rents. See Table 2. 
 
Table 2  Types of Entrepreneurial Rents. 
  Arises as a result of 
Ricardian rent  an entrepreneurial discovery or creation that requires a 
resource where the supply is fixed (unique competence, 
organizational advantage that cannot be imitated, patent, 
copyright, locational advantage etc.) 
Marshallian rent 
(quasi rent) 
an entrepreneurial discovery or creation that requires a 
resource where the supply is fixed or highly constrained 
for some significant period of time (organizational 
superiority, patent protection of limited duration, creation 
of a strong brand name etc.) 
 
The difference is one of degree, depending on how fast the rents are eroded. The duration 
of rents varies substantially. Rents that exhibit the fastest decay pertain to activities which 
are easy to imitate and where the knowledge or skill is not embodied in a specific 
individual or organization. In such cases, the knowledge is easily transmitted at low cost 
and is expected to rapidly disseminate through the economy. Normally, imitating 
competitors enter the market, which increases the supply and lowers the price. According 
to calculations by Nordhaus (2004), entrepreneurs retain on average a mere two percent 
of the total societal surplus generated by their activities.  
 
However, each firm is at the same time a unique combination of resources and 
technologies. A particular combination of human capital and entrepreneurial talent can in 
some cases result in a company where productive entrepreneurship is greatly facilitated. 
Such firms cannot at any reasonable cost be replicated, and the rents generated thus seem 
to be Ricardian.  
 
The Ricardian and Marshallian rents are generated when resources and technology are 
put to use in a way that cannot (at least in the short run) be replicated by other agents. But 
what if replication cannot occur because of government entry regulations? In other   12
words, what about a monopoly situation? Such rents seem, prima facie, to be different 
from the ones discussed as Ricardian and Marshallian rents; they are dependent on some 
formal privileges, awarded only to a subset of all entrepreneurs. This is, however, an 
artifact of not taking institutions into account when discussing entrepreneurship. The 
easiest way to see this is to consider the case of patent protection of an innovation. 
Obviously, the expected rent from an innovation depends on the duration of the patent 
protection. The flip side of patent protection is a barrier to entry for other entrepreneurs. 
The cost for the latter is especially high if certain firms are better at innovation and others 
at cost reduction and marketing. Intellectual property rights tend to involve a tradeoff 
between the two costs.  
 
Hence, we characterize entrepreneurs as rent seekers, i.e., individual agents with 
particular talents for the pursuit of economic rents. Rents can be obtained in many ways, 
such as by introducing an innovation, attaining a monopoly position through a 
government license, earning arbitrage profits and bribing an official to keep competitors 
out.  
 
Entrepreneurial rents should not be considered as excess return that can be taxed away 
with no behavioral effects. Instead, it is the ubiquitous quest among entrepreneurs to 
create and/or discover entrepreneurial rents that gives rise to the continuous structural 
change and dynamism that is necessary for economic development (Caballero 2007). If 
the supply of entrepreneurial effort is elastic with respect to the rents it could be argued 
that the entrepreneurial rents are conceptually not much different from the rent of 
workers (wage income) and the rent earned by savers (interest rate).  
 
Treating the entrepreneur as a rent seeker introduces a change in perspective, where the 
entrepreneur is analyzed at the individual level. As such, entrepreneurs are responsive to 
incentives embedded in their environment.  
   13
6. Exploring the Effects of Institutions on Entrepreneurship 
 
I will now briefly explore the effects of four pertinent institutions in order to illustrate at 
some length why entrepreneurship can only be meaningfully analyzed and understood 




6.1 Protection of Property Rights 
 
Based on broad historical studies such as Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) and North 
(1981) and more recent econometric studies such as Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005), it is now widely recognized that protection of private property rights 
is of fundamental importance for economic growth. With secure exclusive private 
property rights which can be used in voluntary exchanges based on contracts, productive 
entrepreneurship is likely to thrive. This follows because successful entrepreneurs know 
that they will retain the entrepreneurial rents they earn and because specialization and the 
division of labor is greatly facilitated, which broadens the range of potential 
entrepreneurial discoveries.  
 
But weaker property rights will spur other types of entrepreneurship including the 
production of (increasingly diverse and sophisticated) private security services. The 
weaker the property rights, the more predatory the entrepreneurial activities are likely to 
be. This is obvious from a simple comparison of contemporary Zimbabwe and Russia 
with countries like the U.S. or Finland. On the other hand, today’s China shows that self-
employment and entrepreneurship (some of which is evasive and unproductive) provides 
an important avenue for overcoming the impediments caused by weak property rights 
protection. Thus, all forms of entrepreneurship are likely to co-exist when private 
property rights are insecure; although it is clear that below some threshold level property 
rights protection is so low that anarchy ensues (Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe are two 
recent examples).  
                                                 
9 There are a number of additional institutions that are likely to be important determinants of the incentives 
for entrepreneurship, e.g., the regulation of product markets, start-up costs, the regulatory burden on firms, 
the social security system and cultural values vis-à-vis entrepreneurship and self-employment. See, e.g., 
Parker (2007), van Stel et al. (2007), Kanniainen and Poutvaara (2007), and Hessels et al. (2006).    14
 
This point is well illustrated in Coyne and Leeson’s (2004) study of entrepreneurship in 
Romania. They conclude that (p. 243): “There are two ways to interpret the situation in 
Romania. The standard interpretation, reflected in reports by development agencies, is 
that there are high barriers to entrepreneurs and, hence, a shortage of entrepreneurship. 
Another interpretation is that entrepreneurship in Romania is flourishing. The key is the 
distinction we made between productive, unproductive and evasive entrepreneurship. 
Productive entrepreneurship is currently stagnant in Romania. Unproductive and evasive 
entrepreneurship, on the other hand, are alive and well.”  
 
Still, there may also be counteracting effects; if intellectual property rights protection is 
overly strong, innovativeness may be stifled by large incumbent firms that spend large 
resources on defensive patenting and purchases of patents from small innovators in order 
to reduce competition, or if firms file patents for ideas, business models, software strings 
etc. that are obvious and have been around for quite some time without somebody having 
tried to patent them before (Cohen 2005). As documented by Jaffee and Lerner (2004) 
changes in the procedure for the granting of patents in the early 1990s has resulted in a 
deluge of patents and patent suits. Shapiro (2001) describes the US.S. intellectual 
property landscape as a “patent thicket”. Even an inventor with a truly novel idea has to 
face a great risk of running up against related patents whose holders may sue for 
infringement. This overburdened system of excessive protection of property rights 
functions as a tax on innovation, in that both the risk and expected expense associated 
with innovative activity rises sharply. For obvious reasons it also benefits large 
incumbent firms with financial strength and a great deal of legal expertise relative to 
small start-ups. 
 
We conclude this subsection by noting that secure property rights in the basic sense is 
likely to spur productive entrepreneurship. On the other hand, it is in fact likely to reduce 
entrepreneurship as usually measured, since the need for evasive entrepreneurship to 
offset weak property rights is likely to go up. The same is true for unproductive and 
predatory entrepreneurship, since the opportunities for entrepreneurship aiming at the   15
redistribution of income and wealth proliferate when property rights are weakly protected 
or largely undefined. Finally, in recent years the protection of intellectual property has 
been strengthened in ways that raises both the cost and risk associated with innovative 
activity. This excessive protection of property rights is likely to impede productive 
entrepreneurship, but it also spurs evasive and unproductive entrepreneurship to 
circumvent and to exploit the excessive protection of intellectual property. 
 
 
6.2 Savings and Wealth Formation 
 
There are numerous research results suggesting that strong incentives for saving and 
individual wealth accumulation are likely to raise the propensity to entrepreneurship. The 
availability of equity financing is a critical factor for both startups and the expansion of 
existing firms. In general, the riskier the business, the greater is the reliance on equity 
relative to debt financing. The smaller and newer the firm, the more difficult for outside 
financiers to assess the viability and profitability of the venture proposed. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, small and newly established firms are more dependent on equity financing than 
large, well-established firms. Low private savings also exacerbate the inherent problem 
caused by asymmetric information, since wealth-constrained would-be entrepreneurs are 
unable to signal forcibly to outside investors by means of making sizeable equity 
infusions of their own, or, if needed, fully finance the firm until the stage where organic 
growth based on retained earnings is possible. 
 
There is also substantial scientific evidence supporting the idea that the individual wealth 
position has important effects on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and on the 
propensity to expand. This is perhaps the most well-established finding in the small 
business economics literature; see Parker (2004, chapters 5–7) for an overview.  
 
At the aggregate level it is easy to find supportive prima facie evidence of this. 
Entrepreneurial activity as conventionally measured tends to be low in the mature welfare 
states in northern Europe. Welfare state provisions remove a number of savings motives 
for the individual. As long as unemployment insurance, income-dependent pensions and 
sick-leave benefits, higher education and highly subsidized health and care services are   16
provided by the government, most of the essential savings motives for the average person 
disappear.  
 
But the verdict is not that clear cut. The U.S., which is generally considered highly 
entrepreneurial, has a low savings rate. Young (1992) documents that for a long time 
savings rates were about double in Singapore compared to Hong Kong, and the latter 
economy was considered to be the more entrepreneurial of the two, while the GDP 
growth rates were similar. In contemporary China personal savings are extremely high (in 
excess of 30 percent of disposable income) without spurring entrepreneurship and 
business formation commensurately. This partly results from a lack of an insurance 
system that can substitute for the traditional family during a phase of rapid 
industrialization and sharply reduced fertility (Lindbeck 2006), but also the lack of secure 
property rights, the absence of land titles and poorly developed financial markets that can 
channel funds from savers to entrepreneurs.  
 
In an economy with a well-developed financial sector there is a whole spectrum available 
ranging from highly liquid savings that are readily available to long-term institutionalized 
pension saving schemes which put severe restrictions on the owner’s control of the assets. 
In many countries the bulk of personal savings is in the form of long-term pension 
savings, often tied to employment. In addition, pension savings is often tax favored. Peter 
Drucker warned against these tendencies more than thirty years ago (Drucker 1976), 
when he claimed that the trend towards sharply increased saving in the form of corporate 
pension plans was a dire threat to the entrepreneurial society when it concentrated too 
much power in too few hands.  
 
Hence, the composition, and not just the volume, of saving is of importance for 
entrepreneurship. For this reason, any social arrangement that channels savings and asset 
control to large institutional investors is likely to limit the supply of financial capital to 
potential entrepreneurs. 
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6.3 Taxation 
 
In principle, taxation is an infringement on private property rights since it implies that the 
government has a stake in an individual’s income or assets. The effect of taxation on 
entrepreneurship has been much discussed in economics. Following Domar and 
Musgrave (1944) high income taxes have been claimed to encourage self-employment 
both because the self-employed can more easily avoid reporting some of their income or 
they may be able to shift from labor income taxed at a high marginal rate to corporate 
income taxed at a lower rate (Feldstein and Slemrod 1980).  
 
However, these mechanisms are too simplistic to assess the effect of taxation on 
entrepreneurship. To begin with, income from entrepreneurial activities is not a separate 
income category in the tax code. Hence, from a tax perspective entrepreneurial income 
can show up in many different forms: labor income, dividends, capital gains, capital gains 
on stock options, interest income on lending by the entrepreneur to his/her own business 
and so on. 
 
Given the complexity of the tax code in a typical OECD country it is obvious that the 
incentive effects of the tax code on entrepreneurial behavior are also highly complex. 
Some features are likely to be of particular relevance. 
 
King and Fullerton (1984) document that by the 1970s effective tax rates on business 
income came to differ tremendously by source of finance and ownership category in rich 
countries. Debt was the most tax-favored form of financing, and new equity issues were 
the most penalized. In general, business ownership positions held directly by individuals 
and families were taxed much more heavily than other ownership categories. The wave of 
tax reforms that swept the OECD in the 1980s evened out many of these differences 
(Jorgenson and Landau 1993).  
 
These differences in effective tax rates have potentially powerful effects on the 
organization of business activity and the industry mix of productive activity, and 
therefore also on the incentives for entrepreneurship. To the extent that debt financing is   18
less costly and more readily available for larger and more firmly established firms, high 
statutory tax rates coupled with tax-deductible interest payments work to the 
disadvantage of smaller firms and potential entrepreneurs. Debt financing is also more 
easily available to firms with ready forms of collateral. Hence, firms and sectors that 
intensively utilize physical capital reap greater benefits from tax code provisions that 
favor debt financing. This aspect of the tax system favors capital-intensive industries and 
modes of production relative to labor and knowledge intensive ones, which is likely to 
work to the detriment of entrepreneurial, often equity-constrained, firms. 
 
Many economic activities that are highly substitutable between market provision and 
home production (e.g., cooking, cleaning, laundering, landscaping, home repairs) offer 
greater than average scope for self employment, employment in small firms, startups, and 
family-owned businesses. Hence, the effective tax rates on labor income and business 
income accruing directly to households provides yet another channel determining to what 
extent these activities are open for entrepreneurial exploitation. 
 
To a large extent the return on entrepreneurial effort is taxed as wage income. First, the 
tax code may restrict the extent to which income accruing from closely held companies 
may be taxed as capital income. Second, a great deal of the entrepreneurial function is 
carried out by employees without an ownership stake in the firm, and for them the labor 
tax schedule is always applicable.  
 
A further mechanism to encourage and reward entrepreneurial behavior among 
employees is stock options. The efficiency of stock options is highly dependent on the tax 
code. If the gains on stock options are taxed as wage income when the stock options are 
tied to employment in the firm this mechanism will lose much of its incentive effects. 
The situation would be very different if an employee who accepts stock options can defer 
the tax liability to the time when the stocks were eventually sold. This effect would be 
further reinforced if there are no tax consequences to the employee upon the grant or the 
exercise of the option and if the employee is taxed at a low capital gains rate when the 
stock acquired from the exercise of the option is sold. In the latter case the tax risk of the   19
options are pushed back to the government. This accomplishes two things: it increases the 
potential profit from the stock options and it allows budget-constrained individuals to sell 
stocks whenever they chose to do so. The U.S. changed the tax code in the early 1980s 
along the latter lines, which paved the way for a wave of entrepreneurial ventures in 
Silicon Valley and elsewhere (Misher 1984). 
 
Venture capital firms can also play a crucial role in the development of a small 
entrepreneurial venture by converting high-risk opportunities to a more acceptable risk 
level through portfolio diversification, and adding key competencies that the firm may be 
lacking. This is achieved by means of developing arrangements that align the incentives 
of the three agents – investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurial start-ups (Zider 
1998; Gompers and Lerner 2001). The extent to which this is possible is also largely 
governed by the tax code for stock options, capital gains, and whether pension funds are 
allowed to invest in high risk securities issued by small or new companies and venture 
capital funds. 
 
A further effect may be that certain actors such as private equity firms can act from 
offshore tax havens putting them at an advantage relative to individual entrepreneurs. If 
this effect is present it is increasing with respect to the effective tax rates levied on 
entrepreneurs legally domiciled onshore.   
 
To sum up, high taxes may spur self-employment but reduce productive 
entrepreneurship.
10 On the other hand, a high aggregate tax rate is normally associated 
with a generous welfare system, which reduces the push into self-employment. Moreover, 
high tax rates encourage entrepreneurship in the black market and evasive 
entrepreneurship such as the production of legal services helping productive 
entrepreneurs to lower their effective tax rate. But most importantly high effective tax 
rates tend to benefit large incumbent, capital intensive firms that can have high debt 
equity ratios and be owned by institutions, in particular if they are domiciled in tax 
havens. All in all there is reason to believe that high taxes stifle productive 
                                                 
10 Empirically, it has been difficult to establish a negative relation between tax levels and the rate of self-
employment. Schuetze and Bruce (2004) conclude that the evidence is inconclusive.   20
entrepreneurship, although this effect can be greatly mitigated if the taxation of capital 
gains and stock options is low.  
 
 
6.4 Labor Market Regulations 
 
The degree of regulation of labor markets and wage-setting can be expected to influence 
incentives for entrepreneurship, since it restricts the freedom of contracting and therefore 
curtails the possible combinations of factors of production. There are also large cross-
country differences in the extent of labor market regulation. OECD (1994) compares the 
extent of government regulations on labor standards by measuring five different aspects: 
working time, fixed-term contracts, employment protection, minimum wages and 
employee representation rights. In each of these aspects, a country is ranked on a scale of 
0, 1, and 2, where a 2 represents the highest degree of regulation. Adding the five aspects 
together produces an index ranging in value from 0 to 10. Of the 18 countries included in 
the survey, Greece and Sweden exhibited the highest index value (8 and 7 points, 
respectively). The average for all European countries was 4.9. The U.S. scored a zero and 
Canada 2.  
 
There are reasons to believe that strict employment security provisions and other 
regulations that restrict contracting flexibility are more harmful for smaller and/or more 
entrepreneurial employers. One reason involves the gains from efficiently matching 
heterogeneous workers to a variety of tasks and positions. As an employer learns about a 
worker’s abilities over time, or as those abilities evolve with the accumulation of 
experience, the optimal assignment of the worker to various tasks is likely to change. The 
scope for task reassignment within the firm can also be expected to rise with firm size. In 
an unfettered labor market, optimal task reassignment often involves mobility between 
firms, and such mobility is more likely when the initial employment relationship involves 
a small business. Moreover, both the rate at which workers separate from jobs and the 
rate at which employers destroy job positions decline with the size, age and capital 
intensity of the employer (Brown and Medoff 1989; Davis and Haltiwanger 1999). 
Caballero (2007) also shows that the gross flow of workers is higher in firms with high 
productivity growth. These patterns in worker separation and job destruction rates 
suggest that any costs imposed by labor security regulation are likely to fall more heavily 
on younger, smaller and less capital-intensive employers. To the extent that   21
entrepreneurial firms are overrepresented in these categories, labor security regulation 
disproportionally burden entrepreneurial firms.  
 
Finally, a strictly applied ”last in – first out” principle in case of redundancies implies 
that tenure at the current employer becomes relatively more important for labor security 
than individual skill and productivity. This fact increases an employee’s opportunity cost 
of changing employers or of leaving a secure salaried job to become self-employed.  
 
Another labor market arrangement that may impact on the incentives for entrepreneurship 
is wage-setting institutions. Institutional pressures for wage compression are likely to 
disadvantage smaller and more entrepreneurial businesses. Wages are consistently higher 
at larger employers, even after exhaustive efforts to control for observable worker 
characteristics and other job attributes.
11  
 
If regular employment is highly regulated there may be strong incentives to devise 
arrangements that circumvent the regulations. In several European countries new forms 
of flexibility have emerged, which has created more job opportunities than otherwise 
(Blau and Kahn 1999). The most important of these arrangements are increased self-
employment, the emergence of an underground economy where the government refrains 
from enforcing regulations and growth of temporary employment. It is likely that part of 
the increase in self-employment in recent years is driven by such considerations.  
 
To sum up, there is quite a bit of evidence pointing towards differential effects of labor 
market regulations and non-decentralized wage-setting arrangements. Small and 
entrepreneurial firms appear to be disadvantaged. However, rigid regulation may in itself 
spur various entrepreneurial responses to offset and circumvent the rigidities. Self-
employment is one important way, since compensation and working hours are totally 
unregulated and no labor security is mandated. Also very small firms may be able to 
avoid unionization and the signing of collective agreements, and therefore benefit from 
greater freedom of contract. On the other hand, this room of maneuver is likely to be lost 
once the firm size exceeds a certain threshold. These opposing effects are also consistent 
                                                 
11 Oi and Idson (1999) review the evidence in this regard.   22
with the findings of Robson (2003) and Torrini (2005), who do not find any relationship 
between the rate of self-employment and the degree of regulation of labor markets in rich 
countries. 
 
The differential effect of labor market regulations may go a long way towards explaining 
why the rate of self-employment is fairly low in the U.S., while it is very high in Italy. 
One may hypothesize that in the U.S. the really good entrepreneurial firms become fast-
growing gazelles (Birch and Medoff 1994), while the heavy regulations (and high tax 
rates on labor) make it difficult and risky to build large firms in Italy. Instead the firms 
tend to remain small and resort to a strategy of cooperation with other small firms in 
clusters (Lazerson and Lorenzoni 1999). A comparison of Sweden and Denmark provides 
another illustration of this general point. The Danish so-called flexicurity model, where 
hiring and firing can be done at low cost, differs greatly from the Swedish Model, where 
workers can only be dismissed in case of redundancies
12 and number of years of tenure at 
the present employer determines the order of dismissal (Andersen 2007). Although large 
firms are more predominant in Sweden than in Denmark, the Swedish self-employment 




In this paper entrepreneurs have been characterized as rent seekers.
13 Rent seeking entails 
an attempt to reap rewards in excess of the level determined in competitive equilibrium. 
There are numerous means by which rents can be obtained, e.g. introducing a new 
innovation in the form of a superior product or a more cost-effective mode of production, 
attaining a monopoly position by virtue of being granted a government license, arbitrage 
profits, bribing an official to keep competitors out, and, in extreme cases, even looting 
and private warfare. 
 
                                                 
12 Excepting gross misconduct, which is very hard to prove for the employer. 
13 For a full-fledged analysis where the rent seeking entrepreneur is integrated into a growth system, see 
Douhan and Henrekson (2007).   23
Although productive entrepreneurship is a key factor in any prosperous and dynamic 
economy, it is still true that entrepreneurship is not inherently socially productive. This is 
easy to understand if we consider that although the human species has harbored a 
potential for productive entrepreneurship for tens of thousands of years there are no clear 
signs of an entrepreneurially driven growth process until a few hundred years ago. The 
requisite institutions were not in place. Gradually this changed when financially weak 
rulers were forced to concede more and more property rights to other groups. As shown 
by Baumol (2002, chapter 5) it gradually became apparent that more economic freedom 
spurred economic growth, something that gave liberal kingdoms an upper hand. Thus, 
entrepreneurs’ positive and productive response to institutional change created a shift in 
power, which further reinforced the move towards protection of private property.  
 
This account entails a strong claim that the rules of the game, or the institutions, largely 
determine how and where entrepreneurial talent and effort is channeled and the extent to 
which it is supplied. In my view, the larger lesson from these observations is that 
entrepreneurship cannot be studied without taking institutions into account. Entrepreneurs 
are always responsive to the incentives embedded in the environment in which they act, 
and they may even expend entrepreneurial effort to try to change the institutions (Daokui 
Li et al. 2006).  
 
The effect of institutions on entrepreneurship was explored by looking more closely into 
four key institutions in this respect, namely the protection of private property rights, 
savings policies, taxation and the regulation of labor markets. The two most important 
conclusions from this analysis are that (i) institutions have far-reaching effects, and (ii) to 
identify these effects on productive entrepreneurship, the respective institutions have to 
be studied in depth. The Devil is in the details!  
 
The institutional analysis also makes clear that it is problematic to use the rate of self-
employment as a proxy for productive entrepreneurship. There are numerous reasons for 
becoming self-employed, and in many cases it is a second-best response to unfavorable 
institutions. This observation alone justifies a sound skepticism of many of the cross-  24
country studies trying to explain the variation in entrepreneurial activity using self-
employment as a proxy measure.  
 
Hence, entrepreneurship is an elusive concept; it is both analytically intractable and hard 
to measure. So where does this leave us? Should we despair and give up on trying to 
show that entrepreneurship is an essential function in a dynamic economy? Not at all, but 
we should heed the fact that the data used in our analyses were generated in a particular 
institutional environment.  
 
Still, an exhaustive characterization of the institutional setup is not feasible, but the 
crucial elements can and should be identified. Here, entrepreneurship research has a great 
deal to learn from labor economics, where considerable knowledge has been gained from 
the study of quasi experiments, often using instrumental variable techniques; see Angrist 
and Krueger (2001). There are many possible instances that could be utilized. Let me just 
mention two: (i) the different strategies by universities vis-à-vis the involvement of their 
faculty in the commercialization of research (Siegel et al. 2003); (ii) the lessening of the 
employee protection legislation in Sweden in 2001 for firms with fewer than 10 
employees (Lindbeck et al. 2006). 
 
In short, the main message of this paper is that analyses of entrepreneurship should be 
conducted through the lens of the institutional setup. Few, if any, societies have managed 
to completely quell the individual’s innovativeness and pursuit of personal gains. 
However, there are large differences as to whether and to what extent they have managed 
to gain rather than lose from these human traits. Although we may be fairly confident that 
these differences have a great deal to do with institutional differences, we still know little 
at a more detailed level how these effects are borne out, and how entrepreneurs would 
react to specific institutional changes, let alone when and how entrepreneurial effort is 
expended to induce institutional change. There is no lack of important questions for 
future research in this area.  
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